

16/PI

7/26/98

Date:10/07/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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RECORDS SERIES :

6/12/98 SEE ATTACHED DOCS

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DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA.
TO : MILLER, WILLIAM, ATTN: MR. BARONTITLE :
LETTER W/ATTACHMENTSDATE : 08/15/75
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SANITIZED COPIES OF 21 DOCUMENTS FROM VOL I - IV OF THE
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BOX 408-79-----
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

R 772 1621
408-79
15 August 1975

SSCI BOX # 408-79

Mr. William G. Miller

Staff Director

Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities

Washington, D. C.

Attn: Mr. Frederick Baron

Dear Mr. Miller:

As you requested, attached are sanitized copies of
21 documents from Volumes I through IV of the AMLASH/1
file.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

AS SANITIZED

(1)(C) (2) 24 Mar 94

Sincerely,

Seymour Bolten

Assistant to the Director

Attachments:

1. HKH-1385, dtd 30 Nov 56
2. TDCSDB-3/650,097 dtd 2 May 62
3. Helsinki 1609 (In 39865), dtd 4 Aug 62
4. Paris 2629 (In 47183), dtd 17 Aug 62
5. Director 30778, dtd 18 Aug 62
6. Summary Contacts AMWHIP/1 and AMLASH/1, dtd Sep 62
7. Madrid 7818, dtd 29 Jan 63
8. Summary Info Persons in State Memo, dtd 3 Sep 63
9. Porto Alegre 0704 (In 15210), dtd 17 Sep 63
10. Paris 1006 (In 38361), dtd 11 Oct 63
11. London 5224, dtd 15 Oct 63
12. Copenhagen 3399 (In 50855), dtd 30 Oct 63
13. Memo..Record AMLASH/1 Mtg, Paris, 29 Oct 63, dtd 13 Nov 63
14. Contact Plan C/SAS Mtg AMLASH/1 in Paris, undated
15. Cover for C/SAS for AMLASH/1 Mtg in Paris, undated
16. Scenario for C/SAS Mtg with AMLASH/1 in Paris, undated
17. Fall Back Position re AMLASH/1, undated
18. Memo..Record Plans for AMLASH/1 Contact, dtd 19 Nov 63
19. Contact Report AMLASH/1, 22 Nov 63 in Paris, dtd 25 Nov 63
- AUG 15 1975 Director 87980, dtd 18 Dec 63
21. JMWAVE 8660 (In 75929), dtd 7 Dec 63


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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.

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exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date impossible to determine



2/21

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 AUG 62

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DIRECTOR

(REMOVED) 14-1

- C/TFW 5 (C/TFW TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 2215, 3 AUG)
- DD/P, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, COC, C/AE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	14
2	15
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PRIORITY	
IN 39865	

PPITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE HELS 1609

REF (REMOVED) 1584 (IN 38396) &
(REMOVED) 1619 (IN 39589)

FPCY FALUCCI

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AS SANITIZED (1)(b)

24 Mar 94 (en)

1. IN LENGTHY MTGS 1 AND 2 AUG WITH CASE OFFICER AND AMWHIP/1, [REDACTED]

U.S.

[REDACTED] THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE
IDEA COLLECTIVE EFFORT GIVES BEST RESULTS BUT ALREADY [REDACTED]

IN [REDACTED] PENS [REDACTED]

RODRIGUEZ, SOV AND [REDACTED]

SS.

[REDACTED] 1986 TWO CERTAINLY [REDACTED] WHO RELATED

2. TWO PRINCIPAL CONCERN SUBJ ARE SOV EXPLOITATION CUBA FOR CYN ENDS
LATIN AMERICA AND GROWING CONSOLIDATION CASTRO POSITION CLEAN PEOPLE THEY
"EDUCATION" OF YOUTH AND MASSIVE PROPAGANDA EFFORT ON PEOPLE. ALSO
FEARS IN EVENT AGGRESSIVE ANTI- REGIME ACTION SERIOUSLY THREATENING HIS
POSITION. U.S. WILL YIELD EXTREME SOV PRESSURE CUBAN STATUS quo.

FROM FEELS ANY EFFORT MUST COME SOON IF TO BE SUCCESS. ALSO RELUCTANTLY

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5000

3. DURING MTGS SUBJ EXTREMELY INTENSE AND OBVIOUSLY UNDER HIGH EMOTIONAL

L STRAIN. APPEARS CAPABLE PASH VIOLENT ACTIONS UNDER PROVOCATION.

EMPTATION, OR TENSE SITUATION. CONSIDER ~~SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED~~

OBVIOUS SUICIDE PRESSURE

STATE REPEATEDLY HE NOT TYPE SIT TIGHT BUT PREFER VIOLENT ACTION. SAID

HE AGREED WITH ARGUMENT MUST COLLECT INFO, COORDINATE, ETC., BEFORE HIS
TYPE ACTION PLANS. BUT ~~FOR~~ COMMUNICATE AND PLAN.

TYPE ACTION PAYS, BUT HE NOT CONVINCED HE BUYS IT. SUBJ SHOW STRAIN NOT
BEING ABLE TRUST ANYONE. STATED AWWHIP HIS ONLY TRUE CONFIDANT AWWHIP

¹ CASE OFFICER
DID GOOD JOB CONVINCING SUBJ HE SAFELY TALK ↑. 82-3 COMPETE BY 1000

S
U.S.

THIS AREA.

4. NO DISCUSSIONS YET ANY FINANCIAL AID OR OTHER COMMITMENTS.

CASE OFFICER

5. SUBJ MOST WILLING BE DEBRIEFED ALL FIELDS. A FEELS THIS AND FUTURE

HANDLING BEST DONE BY U.S. SPANISH SPEAKING C/O WHO INTIMATELY
FAMILIAR CUBAN SCENE AND LATIN PERSONALITY TYPE FEEL MOST EFFECTIVE WITH

SUBJ IS IDEN: ALSO RECOMMEND POLYGRAPH BEFORE USING SUBJ IF COMPATIBLE

HIS PERSONALITY. FEEL PARI BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR ABOVE.
14-1

6. SUBJ PLANS TO REMAIN IN U.S. UNTIL FESTIVAL FOR COVER SAKE, AIR TRAVEL
CTD 22-7 AUG FOR TWO DAYS. AIR TO BRASHEE FOR TWO DAYS. REQUESTED 6 URGENT

AIR PARI ABOUT 14 AUG WHERE WILL SPEND AT LEAST ONE WEEK. THIS ~~RECOVER~~

SUBJ ALSO CONTEMPLATES

GETTING NAME FROM AYUHIEP.

7. HAVING DECIDED RETURN CUBA SURJ ANXIOUS SPEND MINIMUM TIME EUROPE.

AUGUST 1975 DIA WILL ENROLL OFFICER REFRESHER COURSE TO RENEW ARMY CONTACTS

11A

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AND ATTEMPT RE-ESTABLISH SOME FOLLOWING THESE AND GOVT CIRCLES.

8. AMWHIP PRECEDING SUBJ STOC FOR HANDHOLDING. FEEL ADVISABLE ALSO
PRESENT STOC AINMVISITOR AND CHANNEL CIA IF NEEDED. REMAINING ~~AMWHIP~~
AS CONTACT IF NEEDED BY SUBJ, THEN FOLLOW HIM STOC 7 AUG. MAKING PARI
CONTACT PLANS WILL ADVISE. ¹⁴⁻¹

9. SUBJ'S REVIEW CUBAN ^{WORLD} ^{VICTIM} ^{FESTIVAL} LEADERS AND DELEGATES SHOW ¹⁴⁻¹ ~~AMWHIP~~

OTHER NOTABLES ^{HERE} WHO LEADERS IN "YOUNG COMMUNISTS"
ARE GIRALDO YAZCLA, ALSO ALVAREZ, PRISCO BARROSO. SUBJ CONTINUE LIVING
COMMON DELEGATE QUARTERS. HE NOT DELEGATION LEADER AS ^{AGENT}
REPORTED, BUT "SPECIAL DELEGATE" BY FIDEL'S OK. PLOY GIVEN WAS THAT SUBJ
FATIGUED AND SICK, NEEDED REST, THUS GOT CHANCE TRAVEL TO MEET AMWHIP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: "AMWHIP/1 FIRST CONTACTED AMASH/1 1 AUG. OUTCOME NOT YET KNOWN."

FROM

AUG 15 1975

CIA

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428

17 AUG 62

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1	4
2	5
3	5

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PARIS

TION: C/WE 2 (WE & TFW NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1540, 17

O : DOP, ADDP, C/C1, C/F1, C/TFW 2, S/C 2

AUG 17 1942Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 47183

IN 47183

CPTM DIR INFO WAVE MADR CITE PARI 2629

DL-- 191

- PFF A (REF ID: A689) (IN 39865)
 B DIR 27934 (out 62687)
 C DIR 23521 (out 63601)
 D DIR 29395 (out 64493)

Answered

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 24 Mar 94 *ea*

FROM Case Officer

1. [REDACTED] WITH ATTACHMENT ON THE CASE

ALTHOUGH LASH OBVIOUS UNDER CONSIDERABLE MENTAL STRAIN HE WAS FAIRLY
 RELAXED AT BOTH SESSIONS AND ENTERED FREELY ALL DISCUSSIONS. HE
 IS SUPER SENSITIVE ABOUT SECURITY AND OWN PERSONAL SAFETY.

CONCERNED ABOUT CARELESS TALK BY LUCIA ECHEVARRIA AND EXPRESSED THIS.

DEFINITE WISH HIS GOOD BUT INSECURE FRIEND PONCHO VERONA REMAIN
 UNWITTING HIS COOPERATION. HE APPEARS SINCERE AND HONEST IN HIS
 EXPRESSED DESIRE RETURN PERUMEN ^{CUBA} REMAIN IN PLACE AND COOPERATE.

HE NEITHER ASKED FOR NOR WAS OFFERED ANY FINANCIAL OR OTHER

CONSIDERATIONS.

2.

AUG 15 195

CIA

CUBA

HE HAS

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 declassification

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[REDACTED] HE CLAIMS HE CAN COLLECT INTEL IN ALL FIELDS BUT STRONG POINTS ARE THE UNIVERSITY, ONE ANTI AIRCRAFT BATTALION IN SANTA CLARA AND THE AIR FORCE. HE SAYS HE HAS TWO PERSONAL FRIENDS IN WHOM HE HAS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE BUT CAN CIRCULATE FREELY AND OBTAIN INFO FROM MANY SOURCES, INCLUDING TOP GOVT LEADERS. HE FURTHER PLANS, AS MENTIONED REF A, ENTER MILITARY COURSE FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AT MATANZAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON RETURN BUT DOES NOT KNOW DATE NEXT COURSE WILL BEGIN.

3. [REDACTED]

FEBRUARY CUBAN

[REDACTED] HIS ONLY RESERVATION WAS THAT NO ONE RPT NO ONE KNEW OF HIS RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE OR AFTER ACT. ALSO EXHIBITED WILLINGNESS CONDUCT SABOTAGE. IN THIS CONNECTION [REDACTED]

CUBA

[REDACTED] CASE OFFICER

ARRANGE THIS. HE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] HE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (PARI CAN ARRANGE EXPLOSIVES INSTRUCTION, WITH FIELD DEMONSTRATION IN SECLUDED AREA, VIA TECHNICAL OFFICER WHO WOULD BRING OFFICER FROM [REDACTED] FOR PURPOSE.)

A. HE SAYS HE CAN DO NOTHING AT THIS STAGE TO BUILD UP CONSPIRACY CUBA WITHIN ARMED FORCES OR ELSEWHERE IN PERU. HE REFERRED TO HIS FORMER GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED]

IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE ON THE SOUTH COAST AND [REDACTED]

AUG 15 1968

CTA

PER INSTRUCTIONS PAPA 3 REF C

REF C REPORTS THAT HE IS A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP.

REPORTS THAT HE IS A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP.

CHEBAN IS A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP.

FIDEL CASTRO AND OTHER LEADERS

6. BECAUSE APPARENT FOREIGN SURVEILLANCE DETECTED IS TO 16 AUG
LASH STATION HAS INFORMED LIAISON CIA HAS INTEREST IN LASH
AS POTENTIAL DEFECTOR AND IN CONTACT WITH HIM. LIAISON COOPERATIVE.

7. IN SUMMARY

HE ALSO HAS ABILITY AND COURAGE PREPARE VIOLENT
ACTION TO ELIMINATE PRESENT LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS ACTS SABOTAGE.
CONTROL PROBLEMS POSSIBLE DUE ISOLATION AND LACK PERSONAL DIRECTION
AND GUIDANCE ONCE HE JUURNS PERUMEN. CUBA

DEBRIEFING 17 AUG ON POINTS OUTLINED REF D PRODUCED LITTLE BUT HE
HAD AGREED ACCEPT THESE REQUIREMENTS AS WELL AS ANY OTHERS WE
CHOOSE LEVY AND FULFILL THEM ON RETURN PBRUMEN. CUBA

7. NEED FOLLOWING OPIM:

A.

AUG 15 1968

CIA

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This note was
accordingly left
in the office

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: "FELT THAT USE OF U.S. DROP FOR COMMO FROM CUBA NOT WORTH RISK.

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~~SECRET~~

Sept 62

Summary of Contacts with

AMWHIP/1 and AMLASH/1

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AS SANITIZED (1)(b)

HELSINKI:

24 Mar 94 *ew*

AMWHIP arrived in Helsinki on 30 July 1962. He called according to plan, and after his second call (due to his hotel porter's abysmal understanding of English), Case Officer established contact with AMWHIP without further difficulty. The meeting took place in the restaurant of his hotel, ~~██████████~~ and later in his room. We had not at this time located AMLASH, so the time was spent briefing AMWHIP on the local scene, and on his conduct with AMLASH when they met. The meeting lasted about one and a half hours.

when did he stay?

Later the same day we called AMWHIP at his hotel to report no progress in locating AMLASH. Feeling it advisable to keep AMWHIP occupied, we took him out to dinner at Fisketorpet, located in the suburbs of Helsinki. The evening lasted until 1200, terminating with a drink at the roof bar of the Vaakuna. During the six hours, we had an opportunity to explain carefully to AMWHIP that in order for us to help his friend, AMLASH must be willing to follow our directions and agree to certain conditions (already agreed upon by interested Hqs. parties).

AMWHIP realized that this was necessary, and agreed with our ideas. However,

he is attached to AMLASH, and will continue to look upon him in the most benevolent and subjective manner. This being rather far removed from our

~~RECEIVED FROM~~ ~~AUG 15 1962~~ intended approach to, and opinion of AMLASH. AMWHIP will require handling

~~CIA~~ on a close nature in order that he fully understands and is aware of our

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] walked to AMASH for at least seven hours, from about 1000 in the morning until approximately 1700 the same evening. When AMASH called us at 1700, he presented us with the fact that he had [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Meeting

[REDACTED] would have preferred to talk longer with AMASH about AMASH's reactions, but time did not permit. We arranged a dinner for 2100 at "The White Lady", a restaurant some way from the center of town, and succeeded in obtaining a private dining room, a practice not uncommon in this [REDACTED] Station recommended restaurant, as it is often used by businessmen to have private dinners and afterwards, business discussions.

We arrived at the White Lady first, arranged for the dinner, and awaited AMASH and AMASH, who arrived at 2110 by taxi. Although AMASH had suggested to us that the discussions should be merely devoted to getting acquainted the first evening, [REDACTED]

As reported in our cable, [REDACTED] A-1
[REDACTED] to [REDACTED] Although obviously under emotional strain, [REDACTED] man [REDACTED] was considering not going back to Cuba, but [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of [REDACTED]
He said he was not interested in risking his life for any small undertaking, but that if he could be given a really large part to play, he would use himself and several others in Cuba whom he could rely upon. These he said

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AUG 15 1955

CIA

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-4-

Wise . . . 601

included two majors (one of which AMASHIP later reported was a militia commander in the center part of the island), two captains, and several others whom AMASHIP said he could trust, but whom he would not name.

AMASH said he had no plans to blow up the Cuban Embassy because he believed that the continuing existence of a sensible alliance of North American and Cuban capital depended upon a continuing supply of petroleum surplus which, as we know, are at a critical stage today. He also wanted to prevent the execution of Carlos Rodriguez and the Soviet Ambassador, and to prevent the Soviet by execution if necessary. He feels that if Fidel is eliminated, it would be much easier to effect a take-over. (He listened for the most part, but at this point tried to explain to AMASH that men like Rodriguez could easily be replaced by Moscow, and that the killing of the Soviet Ambassador, would have only the briefest effect on the Soviet control of Cuba.)

[REDACTED] His arguments and plans had many flaws, but Al [REDACTED] 5

[REDACTED] file we were making no
commitments or plans, we pointed out to AMLASH that schemes like he envisioned
certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information-
collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success
of such plans. AMLASH said he agreed with this, but we weren't too sure just

RECEIVED how much of this argument AMLASH was willing, or would be, willing, to buy.

2016.15.145

-5-

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~~SECRET~~

As a matter of record, AMLASH stated during the evening that he had met Algeria's Ben Bella at one time and knows him more than casually. He felt that the man bears strict watching by the West as a measure of protecting its interests in developments in Algeria. AMLASH thought Ben Bella was a clever man, devious, and ambitious, and not to be taken too literally at his word.

In dealing with AMLASH, one trait of his which confronts the C/D at every turn is his temperamental reactions over points which would generally be considered minor. For example, at one time when we were discussing the various aspects of AMLASH's attitude towards the U.S. at the time of his return to Algeria, the use of this term was mentioned. AMWHIP and others present initially was most object to the latter word because it is negative. It was not the act he objected to, but rather merely the choice of word used to describe it. From discussions with AMWHIP, this label of "negative" attitude towards AMLASH's attitude towards the U.S. was considered to be a very strong pre-conceived. Another example, which AMWHIP discussed with us, occurred during a meeting in [REDACTED] According to AMWHIP, A [REDACTED] These examples are pointed out here in order to indicate the degree of pride and sensitivity one finds in AMLASH, and to note that [REDACTED] attitude now became to the C/D attitude. It is apparent that experience may be necessary to change this attitude.

R: ROM
AUG 15 1965

CIA

~~SECRET~~

-19-

3 Sep 63

DC/SAS

1. The following is a summary of information on the persons mentioned in the attached memorandum from THE STATE DEPARTMENT

A. Jose de Jesus JINJAJRA

A Castro bodyguard who is described as a gangster interested in financial gain.

B. (Osvaldo) Antonio CASTELL Valdes

An ~~CP~~ target and old friend of Roalndo CUBELA (more commonly known as "Cubela"). CASTELL was reportedly with the Cuban Security Department and is a cousin of Ramiro Valdes, the Interior Minister. CASTELL is anti-regime and CUBELA believes that he will "fall in line" if there is a successful coup.

C. Roland CUBELA

A medical doctor at Manuel Fajardo Hospital in Havana. He's determined to kill Castro.

D. Marcos GIRON

A negro, about 40, who is described as a communist opportunist. He was formerly a National Police Chief in Havana.

E. Luis FERNANDEZ de la Torre

Reportedly an undercover agent for Castro and member of the G-2. As of July 64 he was a Castro bodyguard.

F. Faure CHOMON

An old friend of Cubela's and Castell's. All fought together against Batista and all were members of the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), a leftist student organization. CHOMON was the Cuban Ambassador to the USSR and is presently the Transportation Minister.

2. Cubela, as you know, has frequently expressed his desire to kill Fidel Castro, in fact, some officers in WH/SA believe that no one would attempt such a feat if it would be Cubela. Cubela's concern, however, seems to be one of assurance and certainly not cowardness. He wants U. S. assurance of immediate intervention should he be successful in disposing of Castro and other leaders. Perhaps this is the "personal safety" which refers to in his letter to Zarraga.

WS 15.15

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3. The presence of two bodyguards in this group indicates the accessibility to their target, a significant factor in a plot of this type, especially since Castro is so closely guarded.

4. Finally, it is not extraordinary that ~~JINSAW~~ should direct his letter to a JURE member, namely Zarzaga. In his talks with ~~CIA~~ OFFICER, Cubela has clearly stated that of all the exile leaders in the United States, he considers Manuel Ray as the only person who would be permitted to return to Cuba, if Cubela is successful in a coup against Castro. Cubela realizes, of course, that Ray is not a politician nor a good organizer, but as an engineer, Ray has the qualities that would be extremely useful in Cuba's reconstruction.

5. If you desire to have this information sent to ~~SRAE DEPT.~~ we would like to include a few questions on Zarzaga; viz his knowledge of several individuals mentioned, on whom there is obscure information.

A1

Addendum: Marcelino ~~ARTIME~~ ~~Vera~~

OB

ARTIME has been a cutout between Cubela and ~~AMWHIP~~ (AMWHIP). Like AMWHIP ~~AGENT~~ is ~~AMWHIP~~ in Havana. Learning that ARTIME is closely tied in with Cubela and ~~AMWHIP~~ supports the belief that the group is tightly knit.

I have learned too, that the information we have received regarding a possible assassination of Fidel Castro has, in nearly every case, originated from a member of this group, which again indicates that this group is united and they each understand that one miscue will destroy all of them.

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Aug 15, 1975

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400

C O P Y (Original copy cannot be reproduced)

TO : DIRECTOR 14-6
FROM : [REDACTED]
ACTION : C/WE 2
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, RF, VR (SUSPENSE DO/

S E C R E T 301530Z

14-6 30 OCT 63 IN 50855

PARI INFO DIR LOND OSLO MADR CPTE [REDACTED] 3399

14-6

REF [REDACTED] 3386 (NOT SENT PARI)

1.

[REDACTED] AND ANGEL QUEVEDO
AN OFFICIAL OF THE CUBAN STUDENTS ORGANIZATION, FEU, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE DIFFI-
CULTIES OCCURRED AFTER BOTH HAD COMPLETED A SENIOR ARMY TRAINING
COURSE AND INSTEAD OF RECEIVING THE RANK OF COMMANDER WHICH THEY
HAD HELD DURING THE REVOLUTION, THEY WERE TOLD BY RAUL CASTRO
THEY WERE BEING DEMOTED TO CAPT. BOTH THEN RESIGNED.

2. AGENT ALSO REPORTS THAT CARLOS FRANQUI HAS BEEN FIRED FROM HIS
POSITION AS EDITOR OF REVOLUCION. THE NEWS WAS PASSED TO
KFRANQUI'S DEPUTY SARUSKY WHO IS PRESENTLY OSLO BY CUBAN PRESS
ATTACHE LOND PABLO ARMANDO FERNANDEZ. AGT' STATES THAT HE HAS
HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT FRANQUI HAS BEEN A PROBLEM TO
CASTRO FOR SOME TIME AND THE LATTER HAS OFTEN COMPLAINED TO

RECEIVED FROM CESAR ESCOBAR, CUBAN PROPAGANDA CHIEF THAT FRANQUI WAS TOO

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~~C O P Y~~

LASSIFIED MESSAGE

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IN 50855 PAGE 2

INDEPENDENT IN HIS WRITING, THINKING. ESCALANTE USUALLY
DISMISSED COMPLAINTS BY SAYING HE HAD NO CONTROL OVER FRANQUI.

3. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

RECEIVED FROM

AUG 15 1968

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~~SECRET~~

~~C O P Y~~